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This brief paper will explain some of the ways that disability policy implementation 
works. It will reveal and examine several of the strategies that have been traditionally 
employed by those with vested interests (key stakeholders) to subvert policy 
implementation processes to their own ends whenever new ideas or new public 
monies arrive in the disability fi eld.
For some 25 years the second author 
worked in Canada, the USA and Australia in 
a variety of positions having to do with the 
formulation and implementation of public 
disability policy. For example, he was for 
fi ve exciting years Director and Consultant 
for Mental Retardation (since Intellectual 
Disability) Services for the Government of 
Newfoundland and Labrador in Canada, 
following this with some years as Director 
of the Victorian Government’s Educational 
Integration Unit, then Principal Disability 
Policy Advisor for Community Services 
Victoria, followed by a number of years as 
Director of the NSW Offi ce on Disability 
in the State Government’s Social Policy 
Directorate 
From lengthy experience in the musty 
heights of various provincial and state 
bureaucracies, several “truths” have been 
revealed to him, generally at moments of 
crisis, and these are as follows:
• It was always very diffi cult to design 
public policies that look good on paper;
• It was even harder to frame them in 
words and catch-phrases that sounded 
pleasing to his political masters; and
• It is incredibly diffi cult to implement 
policies in ways that please almost 
anyone, including those targeted as the 
primary benefi ciaries.
These revelations possibly result because 
governmental policies are likely to be as 
complex as the society upon which, and 
through which they have been designed 
to work. A single government policy 
relating to people with mobility impairment 
for example, may involve the complex 
and interrelated activities of several 
Commonwealth departments, several state 
government departments and a number of 
local governments.
In NSW alone at the state level, there are 
almost 150 government agencies, at least 
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130 of which are required under section 
9 of the NSW Disability Services Act to 
produce formal disability plans. A recently 
adopted government policy might also 
involve private organisations, for example 
the Vision Australia, the Deaf Society or the 
Royal Institute for Deaf & Blind Children 
or the state’s Guide Dogs Association. 
Such professional organisations as South 
Pacifi c Educators in Vision Impairment, 
the Australian Braille Authority, and such 
special interest groups as NSW Institute 
for Family Advocacy might all have a role 
to play or decide that they had something 
to contribute. As well as these, specifi c 
individuals might be involved as customers, 
or consumers. 
The question of how best to control, or 
plan for these multiple interests in the policy 
implementation process is at the heart of 
the challenge that has become universally 
known in the private and public human 
service sectors as the “implementation 
problem”. This brief paper offers the reader 
an opportunity to refl ect on the challenges 
and possibilities in a hypothesised 
orientation and mobility (O&M)-related 
policy implementation process. 
Setting the scene
Orientation and mobility service delivery 
in our country has traditionally been the 
prerogative of highly reputable state-
based and home state-focused charitable 
organisations. Imagine then, a scenario 
in which the Commonwealth and State 
Government Ministers have been persuaded 
by a vocal group of consumer advocates, the 
Australian Blindness Forum and National 
Disability Services (NDS) in Canberra to 
allocate $20million over three years into the 
development of a national comprehensive, 
coordinated, community based service 
system for people who are deemed to have 
orientation and mobility needs. The dream 
of some of those attending the last several 
state and national O&M conferences would 
seem to have come true. But what would 
happen after the policy announcement?
Essentially, someone to whom authority 
has been delegated will have to do some 
planning about how, where and when 
the money will be spent. The challenge 
will essentially involve assembling and 
implementing some form of distributive 
program through an appropriate mechanism 
or process. What is needed at the initial 
stage of this new and exciting project will 
be analogous to an architect’s blueprint. The 
necessary plan can be assembled either from 
scratch or by overhauling and supplementing 
an existing mechanism. Implementation 
will mean aggregating and assembling 
elements and putting the implementation 
machine together, then making it run so 
that the allocated monies will fl ow to the 
benefi ciaries. Hopefully, these will be 
people with O&M needs and their families. 
For those whose responsibility it is to deliver 
the new program, the challenges will mostly 
be about exerting and maintaining control of 
the processes they have devised.
The several parts of the implementation 
‘machine’ will consist of some or all of the 
following:
• An administrative and fi nancial control 
locus or loci;
• Identifi cation of presumptive 
benefi ciaries;
• Private providers of related O&M-
related goods and services, for example, 
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housing, work, educational, health 
services;
• Professionals, developers, perhaps land 
holders;
• Clearances by public regulatory 
authorities;
• Innovations in program and design;
• Other funding sources;
• Trouble shooters;
• Political support to protect and sustain 
the projects as they develop. 
Most of those involved in the numerous 
and diverse elements that together make 
up the O&M services implementation 
project will be relatively independent of 
one another. Their politics can generally 
be assumed to be initially highly defensive. 
They will each want “a cut of the benefi ts 
pie”. However, some will want to avoid 
scrutiny for a variety of reasons; some will 
want to avoid responsibility and all will seek 
to avoid blame should anything go wrong. 
It is essential therefore, that whoever holds 
the authority for implementing the new 
policy should have a clear conception of 
the integration processes that are necessary, 
before specifying the problems that might 
result from them. And before speculating 
about what might have to be done about the 
hypothesised problems.
Viewed from this perspective, 
implementation of the exciting new O&M 
development program might be conceived 
as a playing fi eld on which numerous 
political and bureaucratic games are played. 
The implementation process, involving the 
assembly of a variety of elements, together 
required to produce some particularly 
desirable outcomes, involves therefore, 
playing out a number of loosely inter-related 
games whereby certain elements are 
withheld from, or delivered to the program 
assembly process on particular terms.  
The new project as a system of 
games
The most successful participants involved 
in implementation will tend to see the 
process as a game, rather like chess, checkers 
or Japanese Go. Their motivation is to be 
winners. The games are characterised by a 
need to manoeuvre large numbers of semi-
autonomous actors or participants. Each of 
these will be trying to gain access to certain 
desired program elements that are not under 
his or her control, while at the same time 
trying to extract better terms from other 
players who are seeking to access elements 
that s/he controls. 
Further, most or all program assembly 
processes generally take much longer than 
their sponsors hope or expect they will. 
Delays can result from such management 
games as “stalling”, “thwarting” and 
“postponing”. Delay is perhaps endemic 
to program implementation. It occurs, for 
example through the extra time needed to 
fi nd suitable service providers. This might 
particularly be the case with regard to O&M 
service provision. It might occur through 
the time it takes for potential providers 
to decide on the terms they require before 
committing to the project. Delays in project 
implementation most often occur from 
queuing problems, i.e., from the sheer 
number of transactions that are necessary to 
make the project fl ow. 
Manoeuvres by several players in the 
implementation game can both express 
confl ict and create it. Moreover, with every 
counter-move aimed at reducing confl ict, 
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there is a risk of actually making things 
worse. In fact, much of the implementation 
process for the O&M project will move 
along, out of control, driven by complex 
forces not of any party’s making. There will 
be delay from protracted and frustrating 
negotiation, from unplanned and accidental 
occurrences, blocking delays, adoption of 
alternative time priorities and the seemingly 
inevitable illogicality of collective action. 
The delays themselves will cause actors to 
renege on commitments.
The games people play
Project managers who are held politically 
accountable for the success of the new 
policy initiative are obliged to cope. To 
do so they will have to play management 
games. Typical of these sorts of activities are 
“tokenism” and “monopoly” games. 
• The Tokenism Game involves 
attempting to appear to be contributing 
to the implementation process 
publicly, while conceding only a small 
contribution. The essential management 
tool is procrastination. Another ploy 
is to substitute an inferior quality 
contribution, for example; “we can’t 
arrange appropriately subsidised and 
trained carers, but we can easily and 
quickly arrange...(a less costly and far 
less effective alternative). However, 
tokenism often requires persistence and 
ingenuity, so that many managers seek 
to avoid it as a games strategy, since it is 
time and energy consuming.
• The Monopoly Game. The tokenism 
game is often played by monopolies 
whose will is enforced either by political 
protection or by government agency 
protection. Unions and certain large 
service provider institutions fall into this 
category of player, combining political 
protection with formidable political 
strength. In some ways, with regard to 
the implementation game, monopolies 
are rather like huge whirlpools that suck 
all opposition into their depths. They 
have the capacity to create enormous 
disruption in the policy and program 
implementation process.
A variety of other games will be 
identifi able in the new O&M services 
implementation process, some well-hidden 
(covert), some played on the open playing 
fi eld (overt). These games will include some 
or all the following sorts:
• Energy Dissipation games. These result 
in substantial implementation delays 
as individuals, organisations and other 
stake-holders waste large amounts of 
energy in the following ways:
 (a) By trying to avoid responsibility;
 (b)  By defending themselves against 
the games of others;
 (c)  By trying to set up advantageous 
situations.
• The Tenacity Game. This is a game 
that everyone can play. It involves 
stymieing the progress or completion 
of a particular program until your own 
terms are satisfi ed. Often as a result of 
player tenacity, project death or delay 
is the consequence. The message to 
those charged with O&M services 
project implementation is that the 
risks and costs of altering the potential 
benefi ts of the project from its generally 
accepted objectives will require careful 
consideration before engaging in these 
sorts of activities. 
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• The Territory Game. The acquisition 
of new territory is a game played by 
all bureaucratic organisations and it 
can often have positive results as long 
as no one really wins and as long as 
the tensions that are created generate 
information leading to evaluation. 
Competition for territory can have 
adverse effects if it interferes with 
operational responsibilities that ought to 
be coordinated.
• The “Not Our Problem” Game. The 
desire for expanded territory and 
augmented budgets rapidly evaporates 
when organisations realise that a 
particular implementation problem will 
impose a heavy workload or launch 
them into the realms of controversy or 
blame, or that the required tasks are 
too diffi cult and they lack the capacity 
to successfully undertake them. The 
solution is to shift the problem. If 
nobody wants the problem area, the 
regulatory activities that arise from it are 
simply not performed and the users or 
customers start to get the “run around”.
• The “Their Fault” Game. This is a more 
aggressive form of the “not our problem” 
game in which blame for failure is 
defl ected by fi nding a scapegoat. A 
particular feature of the game is that the 
numbers of players who can be drawn 
into it affects its outcomes. The more 
actors who can be persuaded to play 
the game the less likely is program 
completion. The greater the number 
of delays generated, the less likely is 
the project or program to succeed if 
completed. 
• The Odd Man Out Game. This is a 
game played by relatively autonomous 
players once they have weighed-up the 
playing fi eld and made decisions about 
their contribution to the implementation 
process. These organisational leaders or 
individuals are generally uncertain about 
the actions of the other players. As the 
policy initiative implementation process 
develops and expands, their uncertainty 
is either reduced or magnifi ed and this 
creates or maintains options for some of 
them to “cut their losses” and withdraw. 
As the several actors continue to monitor 
what is going on, they simultaneously 
attempt to manoeuvre the other players 
into foregoing their options. If the 
uncertainties are large enough, none of 
the players will be willing to make the 
early moves and the program will not 
get off the ground.
• The Resource Diversion Game. Some 
of the implementation games that have 
adverse effects on the program assembly 
process include the following: 
 (a)  Diversion of money (resources) 
that ought to be used to obtain 
or create some of the program 
elements,
 (b)  Defl ection of the policy goals 
stipulated in the original mandate, 
 (c)  Resistance to all efforts to control 
behaviour administratively; and 
 (d)  Dissipation of personal and 
political energies in games playing 
that might otherwise be channelled 
into constructive program actions. 
• The Easy Money Game. This is a game 
often played by parties in the private 
sector who wish to make off with 
Government monies in exchange for 
program elements of too little value. 
Their activities are not invariably illegal. 
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Sometimes they arise from unclear 
agreements about what should happen. 
Sometimes Easy Money games take the 
form of bilateral monopoly games that 
have one round of play. Sometimes, a 
great deal of time and effort is wasted 
in games that involve continued liaison 
with all the affected public agencies and 
political authorities. The Americans call 
these behaviours “boondoggles”. On the 
darker side of these games one can fi nd 
abuses of public trust, graft, kickbacks, 
bribes and vertically integrated 
monopolies. A classic example of this 
sort of game might involve doctors who 
accept fees from private patients, who 
then place the patients in the nursing 
homes they (the doctors) own and 
receive pharmacy kickbacks from the 
monopolies they create.
• The Goal Defl ection Game. Typically 
the goals in the original policy mandate’s 
implementation processes will change 
over time to accommodate changes in 
time, environment and player turnover. 
These shifts are particularly problematic 
when the original goals are ambiguous 
or when problems have been initially ill 
defi ned and understood, or in instances 
where there has been weak consensus 
among key players. Additionally, 
those with interests opposed to the 
project’s original goals might have 
stayed quiet during the initial phases of 
implementation, and have been waiting 
for an opportunity to have their way. 
A policy of renegotiating goals can 
lead to trimming them back, as well as 
distorting or preventing their attainment. 
As project goals become redundant, they 
are added to the unsupportable political 
burden of the project and become a 
danger to its continuance. 
• The Easy Life Game. This is a game 
generally played by public servants 
who tailor the environment to suit 
themselves. This is a particularly easy 
end to accomplish when services involve 
rationing. Rationing leads to queueing 
which results in a relatively powerless, 
voiceless and disorganised public. The 
Easy Life game is best played with 
reorganisation, restructure and incessant 
transition as its strategies.
• The Pork Barrel Game. Because the 
political process expands the boundaries 
of eligibility for benefi ts from most 
projects, and because Government 
needs support from as many sources 
as possible, there is always an attempt 
at spreading resources. Pork barrelling 
is the process that ensures that ones 
friends, relatives and mates benefi t 
from what is within one’s hands to 
give. For example, representatives of 
“the powerless poor” or the “disabled 
minority” concentrate on securing 
payments for themselves and positions 
of infl uence for their family and friends. 
This phenomenon generates as well as 
results in “patronage”.
• The Piling-on Game. This is a game in 
which the initial successes of a project 
or a new program provide the potential 
for longer-run debilitation. The new 
program is in fact seen primarily as 
a new political resource, and all the 
players “pile-on” to the band wagon, 
until the wheels collapse and the 
program founders, having run its course 
to the benefi t of the few who jumped on 
early.
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• Budget Games. These generally take the 
form of budget maximisation activities in 
which implementation success depends 
on shaping incentives for those who 
control the budgets. Some games take 
the form of “ready-to-go, must “move 
the money” strategies. Others involve 
infl ating the costs of goal attainment 
by “padding”. In others the designers 
provide few incentives for the resource 
donors to police spending. In others there 
are diffi culties in specifying quantifi able 
indicators. In general terms, the older a 
money-moving agency grows, the less 
adventurous and ideological it becomes.
• The Up-for-Grabs Game. Sometimes 
a new policy or program mandate 
provides elements, for example, a 
piece of bureaucracy with a modest 
budget, without actually prescribing or 
envisioning its purpose or its connection 
to other elements of the system. These 
few unambiguous elements are “up-
for-grabs” to be shaped to whatever 
ends generate the most gains for the 
“grabber”. 
• The Keeping the Peace Game. Some 
social programs and policies originate 
from a desire to “do the right thing” 
and extirpate a real or imagined evil. 
The arenas on which these games 
are played are generally replete with 
players who are hotheads, zealots or 
extremists. Actors are sometimes intent 
on sparking a counter-reformation, or 
on intense scrutiny, or on criticising or 
even terrorising. The goal for the senior 
manager or project executive in these 
circumstances is to “keep the lid on” 
the implementation process, while those 
with special agendas attempt to capture 
the program. This they do by, for 
example, offering to write the program 
guidelines or regulations. 
Advice to program managers and 
policy advisers
Policy and program implementation, with 
regard to the $20 million new O&M services 
development initiative that provides the 
“playing fi eld” for some or all of the games 
outlined above, should the advocacy groups 
and NDS dream come true, would almost 
certainly result in a display of pressure 
politics. Those involved in the process should 
expect to either observe or participate in an 
ongoing series of bargaining, manoeuvring 
and pulling and pushing as the policy 
adoption process spills over into actual 
implementation. 
In all the “jockeying” the die-hards who 
believe they have in some way lost out, will 
seek, when the guidelines and regulations are 
being drafted, to continue their opposition. 
The entire project implementation process 
can be conceived as a system of pressures, 
with delay as an endemic characteristic. 
With regard to the administrative 
processes that are essential to all forms of 
policy and project implementation, managers 
and advisers should expect to encounter 
a variety of forms of “authority leakage” 
because individual agency offi cials will 
have varying goals and use their discretion 
in translating orders.  Further, the dynamics 
of organisational recruitment often create 
conservative middle managers and often, the 
lower staff echelons within agencies have 
autonomous power bases. 
Implementation of the new O&M policies 
and programs will be driven by inter-
organisational transactions with government 
offi cials, clients, private contractors, 
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professional groups and publicists, all 
articulating their own special fears and 
anxieties. Successful implementation 
depends to a large extent on the “massing of 
assent” from those who are key stakeholders.
There are a great many issues arising 
from the various games described above, 
that touch upon the recurrent theme 
of the particularity of human service 
organisations. For example, such issues as 
rapidity of change and the large amount 
of external determination of change; the 
value dimension, for example, the issue of 
legitimacy, and aspects refl ected by differing 
attitudes. 
The reader can be quite sure that the 
creation and introduction of new forms of 
O&M service to Australians who are blind 
or vision impaired will involve, for better 
or worse, compromise on most important 
issues. Most importantly, it is essential for 
all key players in such an undertaking to 
remain optimistic and retain the primacy 
of having goals that will ultimately benefi t 
people who require O&M skills. 
Ideas in this article are based on Eugene 
Bardach’s (1977) timeless classic The 
implementation game: What happens after 
a bill becomes law. 
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